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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Effects of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception in Asia 
 
 
by 
 
 
Joseph R. Johnson 
 
Utah State University, 2018 
 
 
Major Professor: Yesola Kweon 
Department: Political Science 
 
 
How does exposure to foreign cultures affect public opinion?  Many states rely on 
cultural diplomacy programs to improve their national image abroad.  Some scholars, however, 
argue that cultural exports can lead to nationalist backlashes of negative opinion that outweigh 
their positive effects.  In this paper, I use survey data from Asia to compare the effects of 
cultural product exports and cultural centers on international opinion.  I find that cultural 
product exports from Japan, South Korea, and China have a negative effect on international 
opinion in all three cases.  I then use the same survey data to compare this with the effects of 
Confucius Institutes (Chinese cultural centers that offer language training) and find that they are 
associated with an increase in positive views of China.   These findings demonstrate that 
different cultural diplomacy strategies can have different effects on foreign public opinion, 
something that future research on cultural diplomacy should take into account. 
 (61 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of Cultural Diplomacy on Public Perception in Asia 
 
Joseph R. Johnson 
 
Many states use their cultures to promote a positive image of themselves abroad. Some 
scholars argue that this can provide states with international benefits.  However, other scholars 
point to cases where a foreign state’s cultural influence has led to nationalist backlashes and 
negative public reactions.  In this paper, I examine how two common types of cultural diplomacy 
programs can influence how states are perceived abroad.   
I first look at the promotion of pop culture products, such as books, movies, and music.  
Using survey data from 12 Asian countries, I find that an increase in cultural product imports 
from Japan, South Korea, and China has a negative effect on how respondents view the cultural 
exporter.  I then look at cultural centers, using China’s Confucius Institute program.  I find that 
the presence of Confucius Institutes is associated with an increase in positive opinions of China.  
These results provide some empirical evidence that cultural products can be detrimental to a 
state’s international image.  As a result, states interested in the international benefits of cultural 
diplomacy should be wary of promoting cultural products abroad.  Additionally, while previous 
studies do not distinguish between the effects that different types of cultural diplomacy 
programs can have, these findings demonstrate that different cultural diplomacy strategies can 
have widely different effects on foreign public opinion. 
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Chapter I 
Research Question 
How does exposure to foreign cultures affect how individuals perceive the cultural 
producer?  This question is important because cultural diplomacy—the use of a state's national 
culture in order to advance its foreign policy goals or foster mutual understanding—has become 
a key part of many foreign policy strategies in recent years.  Cultural diplomacy strategies 
include promoting distinctive cultural products (like music, books, and television programs), 
establishing cultural centers in foreign states, organizing or providing funding for festivals and 
cultural celebrations abroad, and sponsoring artist exhibitions or performances (Mark, 2009; 
Melissen, 2005; Gilboa, 2008).  During the 1950s and 60s, for example, the State Department 
and the CIA sent contemporary art from American artists like Jackson Pollack, alongside jazz 
musicians like Duke Ellington and Loius Armstrong, around the world as cultural ambassadors.  
Prevots (2001) writes that “modern art reinforced an image of the United States as the new 
leader of the avant-garde, and was said to embody the American spirit of enterprise and 
individual freedom” (p. 3).  The United States also developed cultural centers during the Cold 
War in countries like Austria and Pakistan, and “the value these American Centers [had] on 
instilling positive perceptions of the United States abroad cannot be exaggerated” (Finn, 2003, 
p. 17).  Programs like these are seen today as examples of successful cultural diplomacy 
strategies that can advance a state's foreign policy objectives. 
States engage in cultural diplomacy with the expectation that it will benefit their 
national image, which is seen as increasingly important by policy-makers.  One of the main 
purposes of cultural diplomacy is to improve a state's national image abroad.  Gilboa (2008) 
writes that “favorable image and reputation around the world, achieved through attraction and 
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persuasion, have become more important than territory, access, and raw materials, traditionally 
acquired through military and economic measures” (p. 56).  Many policy-makers and academics 
argue that a positive national image can help states advance their foreign policy agendas and 
encourage foreign investment.  A good national image can be used to help build coalitions and 
alliances (Nye, 2004), influence perceptions and decisions in interstate negotiations (Jeffe and 
Nebenzahl, 2001), and attract foreign investment and inbound tourism (Kotler and Gertner, 
2002; Tapachai and Waryszak, 2000).  As a 2005 US State Department report reads,  
“Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a 
nation’s idea of itself is best represented. And cultural diplomacy can enhance our 
national security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways. Indeed history may 
record that America’s cultural riches played no less a role than military action in shaping 
our international leadership, including the war on terror” (p. 1).   
This passage underscores the growing importance policy-makers have come to place on the role 
of culture in building relationships around the globe.   
There is, however, a disagreement in the literature about the efficacy of cultural 
diplomacy strategies.  While some scholars argue that improving a state's national reputation 
and image can provide the state with tangible benefits, other scholars argue that cultural 
diplomacy does not actually have a positive effect on national image and can therefore be 
counterproductive.  This is because a major increase in the cultural presence of a foreign state 
can lead to nationalist backlashes against the perceived cultural intrusion (Chua, 2012; Hall and 
Smith, 2013).   
Critics of cultural diplomacy point to several examples of these backlashes occurring in 
Asia in recent years.  For instance, in 2005—following a region-wide surge in popularity of 
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Korean cultural products like pop music and television dramas—Taiwanese rock star Wu Bai 
held a concert that featured songs “laced with obscenities against Korean culture” (Chua, 2012, 
p. 147).  The same year saw the emergence of Manga Kankanryu, Japanese comics that decried 
South Korea as a “thoroughly depraved nation” and an enemy of Japan (Liscutin, 2009, p.172).  
In 2004, Chinese students protested a sold-out concert being held by popular Taiwanese singer 
Chang Huimei—who had become politicized in mainland China after her performance at the 
2000 inaugural ceremony of the Taiwanese president—leading local police to shut down the 
concert (Chua, 2012).  Examples like these demonstrate that while greater exposure to foreign 
cultures might generate positive reactions within one facet of the population, it might 
simultaneously prompt a negative reaction within a different, larger segment.   
Despite the disagreement over the merits of cultural diplomacy strategies, there 
remains a lack of cross-national empirical evidence testing their effectiveness.  Chua (2012) 
writes that the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy “can only be verified and substantiated by 
empirical evidence of audience behavior subsequent to reception; there should be evidence of 
changes in attitude in the audience towards the exporting nation” (p. 136).  This research aims 
to contribute to this evidence by looking at how individual perceptions are influenced by 
changes in the foreign cultural programs they are exposed to.   
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Literature Review and Theory 
The literature pertaining to cultural diplomacy is divided on whether or not cultural 
diplomacy is effective.  States engage in cultural diplomacy with the expectation that outsiders 
will associate their cultural products and ideas with their national cultural identity and that this 
will improve how they are perceived abroad.  Having a positive national image will in turn help 
states advance their political agendas and make themselves more attractive to foreign 
investment.  While the link between national image and political/economic benefits is fairly well 
established in the literature, the link between cultural diplomacy and a more positive national 
image is much more tenuous.  This has led to conflicting empirical predictions regarding the 
effects of cultural diplomacy. 
Many scholars agree that improving a state's national image can provide that state with 
tangible benefits.  Thanks to advances in communication technology—which have resulted in 
the spread of global communication networks and increasingly activist civil societies—public 
opinion at home and abroad has become an important factor in international relations 
(Melissen, 2005).  Foreign public opinion has a tangible impact on states because it can affect 
what policy choices are politically feasible for other governments.  The perspectives of foreign 
publics form a climate of opinion that can broaden or limit the selection of policy choices that 
foreign policy-makers can realistically pursue (Wang, 2006).  If a foreign public has a largely 
positive view of one country's influence, their government will be more willing to cooperate 
with that country (Bound et al., 2007).  Foreign citizens will also be more likely to invest in and 
travel to that country, resulting in direct economic benefits.  States compete with one another 
to attract foreign investment and skilled migrants, and an attractive national image helps them 
compete successfully (Mark, 2009; Tapachai and Waryszak, 2000).   
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Proponents of cultural diplomacy argue that culture can benefit national image because 
culture can emphasize attractive national values and ideals and help combat stereotypes and 
ethnocentrism (Mulcahy, 1999).  Additionally, Mark (2009) writes that “In presenting a national 
image abroad, cultural diplomacy can overcome audience suspicion of official messages and 
serve to provide substance to national reputation” (p. 1).  There are also domestic benefits to 
cultural diplomacy.  Culture is a key part of national identity, and a strong sense of common 
national identity provides governments with legitimacy and domestic political support (Huang, 
2011; Barr, 2012). Strong cultural industries can also bring economic benefits through cultural 
exports and increased tourism.  States generally engage in cultural diplomacy with both these 
international benefits and domestic benefits in mind.   
Some scholars, however, contend that cultural diplomacy does not actually have a 
positive effect on national image and can therefore be counterproductive for states trying to 
achieve these international benefits.  This is because a noticeable increase in the cultural 
presence of a foreign state can lead to nationalist backlashes against the foreign culture (Chua, 
2012).  No matter how popular or widespread a particular foreign cultural program or product 
might be in a country, the people who engage directly with that product are outnumbered by 
those who do not.  When faced with a growing foreign cultural influence, this larger population 
“could be readily mobilized, firstly, against its importation and, secondly, to confront the 
audience of imported products, in the name of protecting the domestic, national culture, with 
the tacit or explicit support of local culture producers and the state” (Chua, 2012, p. 158).  These 
backlashes can serve to undermine the positive effects of cultural diplomacy and potentially 
result in cultural diplomacy having an ultimately negative impact on national image.   
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The difference between the advocates and skeptics of cultural diplomacy comes down 
to the link between exposure to foreign cultural programs and foreign public opinion.  If a 
cultural diplomacy strategy is correlated with an overall positive effect on how states are 
perceived abroad, we would expect it to result in the political and economic benefits outlined in 
the literature.  However, based on the literature and examples of nationalist backlashes against 
cultural exporters, there is reason to believe that cultural diplomacy does not always achieve its 
international purpose of positively influencing public opinion abroad.  If cultural diplomacy does 
not encourage more positive views of a country among foreign populations, then it will fail to 
bring about the international benefits states are trying to achieve.  Despite the conflicting 
empirical predictions, previous studies do not empirically examine the effectiveness of cultural 
diplomacy.  The goal of this paper is to look at whether or not cultural diplomacy has a positive 
influence on a state's national image in other countries.  To do this, I test whether increased 
exposure to foreign cultural programs has a positive effect on individual views of the cultural 
producer. 
There is also very little discussion on how different strategies can affect the outcome of 
cultural diplomacy.  One way this research aims to contribute to the literature is by examining 
the different effects of two cultural diplomacy strategies: the promotion of pop culture exports 
and the development of cultural centers.  The nationalist backlashes referenced in the literature 
have occurred in response to influential pop cultures, which could mean that cultural diplomacy 
strategies relying on pop culture exports do not actually have a positive effect on foreign 
perception.  Cultural centers, on the other hand, focus on language learning and traditional 
cultural celebrations.  Traditional culture is seen as less threatening than pop culture, and 
previous research has found a correlation between second language learning and more 
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sympathetic views of a foreign culture.  As a result, cultural centers might be more effective at 
improving international public opinion than strategies that focus on increased pop culture 
exports.  
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Overview of Cases 
I focus on cultural diplomacy in Asia because the region has become a hot spot for 
active cultural diplomacy since the turn of the century.  Governments in Asia spend more money 
on these strategies than in anywhere else in the world (Anholt, 2008).  China alone spends 
nearly $9 billion a year on efforts to improve its international image, including significant 
investments in cultural development and its Confucius Institute program (Hall and Smith, 2013).  
This research focuses on the three most influential cultural producers within Asia:  Japan, South 
Korea, and China.  While all three states have invested significantly in cultural diplomacy, each 
of them has different motivations and has employed different approaches. 
The Japanese government engages in cultural diplomacy as a way to offset its declining 
economic influence relative to China.  Compared to China and South Korea, Japan takes a hands-
off, bottom-up approach to cultural diplomacy by offering support to private organizations 
already promoting Japanese cultural products abroad.  For example, the Japan Foundation 
provides institutional support for foreign anime production companies and limited funding for 
privately run anime fan conventions outside of Japan (Heng, 2010).  They do not, however, 
directly support the Japanese animation industry. 
The South Korean government, meanwhile, uses cultural diplomacy as a way to grow 
their international influence through expanding media markets.  Like Japan, the South Korean 
approach also relies on private organizations, but it uses tax breaks and other incentives to 
encourage large Korean corporations to invest in cultural production.  Thanks to these 
incentives, major corporations ranging from Samsung to Hyundai own and produce nearly all 
South Korean entertainment media and other cultural products. 
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As China is rapidly becoming a regional and global power, Chinese leaders depend on 
cultural diplomacy to demonstrate good intentions and support the idea of China's peaceful rise 
(Ding and Saunders, 2006).  Chinese policy-makers employ a relatively top-down approach, 
using direct government investment in their cultural industry and government programs 
overseen by the state itself (Heng, 2010).  For example, the Chinese government covers up to 
40% of any production costs incurred by animation studios in order to encourage cultural 
production and cultural product exports.  
China also has an ambitious cultural center program at the heart of its cultural 
diplomacy strategy.  Cultural centers generally serve as language training facilities and also host 
traditional cultural celebrations.  This sets cultural centers apart from pop culture products 
because these functions are not associated with the same kind of protests and nationalism 
abroad.  As a result, cultural centers might be a way for cultural diplomacy strategies to avoid 
the backlashes we have seen in response to pop culture products.  This gives me the opportunity 
to compare how different kinds of cultural diplomacy programs influence foreign public opinion.   
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Outline of Chapters 
The main purpose of this paper is to test the effects of cultural diplomacy on foreign 
public opinion.  In order to provide a more nuanced understanding of this process, I also 
differentiate between the effects of pop culture development and promotion versus cultural 
centers and language training.  To do this, I conduct two empirical tests. 
In Chapter II I focus on the pop culture aspect of cultural diplomacy, using the 
AsiaBarometer survey series (Inoguchi, 2003-2007).  I compare the effects of cultural product 
imports from Japan, South Korea, and China on how these countries are viewed throughout the 
region.  I find that an increase in cultural product imports to the respondent's country is 
associated with a statistically significant decrease in positive views of the cultural producer.  This 
suggests that promoting pop culture products abroad can actually hurt a country's national 
image.  This effect is greatest for Japanese cultural products, still fairly large for South Korean 
cultural products, and relatively small for Chinese cultural products.  I cover some explanations 
for this difference in magnitude and talk about its implications for cultural diplomacy policy.  For 
example, if governments perceive the domestic benefits of pop culture development as being 
greater than the negative effect these programs can have on international public opinion, they 
might still view the programs as worthwhile investments. 
In Chapter III, I examine the effects of cultural centers using China's Confucius Institute 
program.  Using the same methods as in Chapter II, I find that Confucius Institutes are 
associated with an increase in positive views of China in other Asian countries.  This finding 
suggests that cultural centers could be a way for governments to gain both the domestic and the 
international benefits of cultural diplomacy.  It also demonstrates that different types of cultural 
diplomacy programs can have different effects on international perception.  Language training 
11 
 
and traditional cultural celebrations are viewed as less political and less threatening than pop 
culture products, and as a result it seems they are less likely to be met with nationalist 
backlashes.  Nevertheless, the lack of emotional attachment people have to traditional cultures 
would also suggest the domestic benefits of cultural centers are significantly less than the the 
domestic benefits of pop culture development.  If so, the domestic benefits alone would be 
enough incentive to keep these programs running.  As a result, it seems likely that China and 
other states engaging in cultural diplomacy will continue to employ both types of programs. 
Chapter IV covers some of the implications these results have on cultural diplomacy 
policy in general and areas for further research.  Other countries have recently begun investing 
in branding campaigns and cultural diplomacy programs, including New Zealand, India, and 
Australia.  This research can help better inform states about the costs and benefits of different 
cultural diplomacy programs.  Cultural centers can lead to both domestic and international 
benefits, while pop culture development and promotion can lead to potentially greater 
domestic benefits while simultaneously undermining cultural diplomacy's international 
objectives.  These findings are also interesting because they highlight the different effects of pop 
culture versus traditional culture on national image abroad.   
Going forward, this research opens up several avenues for further research on cultural 
diplomacy and cultural development.  Because pop culture diplomacy does not provide states 
with international benefits, without any domestic benefits these kinds of cultural diplomacy 
strategy would be counterproductive.  As a result, one area in need of further research would be 
the different roles and significance of pop culture compared to traditional culture in the 
development of national identities.  Similarly, another area would be the economic benefits of 
larger pop culture industries.   Finally, further research is needed on the effects of other cultural 
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diplomacy programs not covered in this paper, such as educational exchanges and sporting 
events. 
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Chapter II 
Pop Culture and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia 
While the use of pop culture as a means of cultural diplomacy is often considered a 
relatively new development, it has been around for nearly as long as the concept of cultural 
diplomacy itself.  Two of the earliest cultural diplomacy programs were those of France and the 
United Kingdom, both of which rely on traditional culture and the influence of their colonial 
pasts.  The French cultural relations program goes all the way back to the late 1800s, and 
focused on promoting French culture in its colonies in Africa and the Middle East.  British 
cultural diplomacy formally began in 1934 with the creation of the British Council, whose goal 
was to “render available abroad current British contributions to literature, science, and the fine 
arts” (Mulcahy, 1999, p. 9).  Not long afterwards, however, the United States turned to its 
growing pop culture influence around the world as a sort of Cold War weapon.   By the 1970s 
the United States had begun to send actors, artists, and jazz musicians around the world as 
“cultural ambassadors.”  The goal of this program was to use pop culture in order to emphasize 
the attractiveness of American values and ideals such as equality and the freedom of expression 
(Cull, 2009).  After the Cold War ended, the United States' emphasis on cultural diplomacy 
began to wane.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, pop culture diplomacy made 
its debut in East Asia.  
The first Asian state to experience a modern wave of cultural popularity outside its own 
borders—and subsequently one of the first to make pop culture a key part of its cultural 
diplomacy strategy—was Japan. Japan's humiliating defeat in World War II led to an era of 
nationwide soul-searching, and “the Japanese route to modernization was thus accompanied by 
the pursuit of identity” (Huang, 2011, p.5). This resulted in a rediscovery of Japanese traditional 
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culture and the development of unique popular culture during the 1960s and 70s.  Shortly after, 
Japanese culture began to spread outside Japan's borders and become hugely popular 
throughout Asia during the 1980s and 90s.  Especially popular were Japanese television dramas 
like Oshin (1983-84) and Tokyo Love Story (1992).  The success of these programs demonstrated 
to Japanese leaders that lingering animosity over Japanese colonialism and war crimes would 
not prevent Japanese cultural products from being eagerly consumed by Japan's neighbors 
(Iwabuchi, 2015).   
Nevertheless, it was not until the early 2000s that the Japanese government first made 
a concerted effort to capitalize on the international success of Japanese pop culture products.  
The Japanese government passed a series of laws between 2001 and 2004 aimed at offering 
support for media organizations promoting cultural products, including the Fundamental Law 
for the Promotion of Culture and the Arts in 2001, the Plan for Promoting Japanese Film and 
Image in 2002, and the Content Promotion Law in 2004 (Chua, 2012).  A number of government 
committees were established with the goal of advancing the Japanese cultural industry, 
including the Head Office for Intellectual Property Strategy (2002), the Research Committee for 
Content Business (2005), and the Council for the Promotion of International Exchange (2006) 
(Iwabuchi, 2015).  By 2006, the government had committed itself to “ensuring that Japanese 
content creators and providers—anime, J-Pop, film studios, game developers, toy producers, 
and virtually any other entertainment industry capable of catching global attention—remain 
competitive over the long term” (Leheny, 2006, p. 228).   
Similarly to Japan's experience following World War II, South Korea went through a 
search for identity during the last decades of the 20th century.  The Korean cultural industry was 
nearly destroyed by an influx of cultural products from the United States and Japan in the late 
15 
 
1980s and early 1990s.  This stimulated the rise of nationalism and brought about a national 
discourse on Korean identity (Huang, 2011).  The Korean government acted on this growing 
movement by establishing the Cultural Industry Bureau in 1994 and beginning to provide 
financial support for Korean cultural producers.  In 1995, the government passed the Motion 
Picture Promotion Law, which offered incentives such as major tax breaks for chaebols (large 
family-owned businesses like Samsung, LG, and Hyundai) to invest in South Korea's film industry 
(Kang, 2015).  The law also deregulated aspects of the film industry, making it easier to fund and 
export Korean media productions.   
These efforts seemed to pay off, and in the early 2000s South Korea experienced its own 
wave of cultural penetration throughout Asia.  Copying the same genre of trendy television 
drama that proved to be such a success for the Japanese cultural industry, South Korean 
television programs like Autumn in My Heart (2000) and Winter Sonata (2002) swept across East 
and Southeast Asia.  By 2005, propelled by the success of these television dramas and a number 
of internationally recognized pop stars, South Korea had begun to replace Japan as the 
predominant cultural force in the region (Chua, 2012).    
Unlike Japan, the South Korean government began to cultivate its cultural industry and 
incorporate Korean pop culture as a part of its cultural diplomacy strategy before Korean 
cultural products began to experience international success.  Korean leaders quickly understood 
that Korea “cannot compete with other advanced industrialized countries in the area of hard 
power” and instead turned to cultural diplomacy “as Korea’s political and economic instruments 
of high significance” (Geun, 2009, p. 124).  While the Korean strategy can easily be categorized 
as a more “top-down” approach to cultural diplomacy than Japan's—which relies on private 
groups and individuals to take the initiative and simply offers them support—it nevertheless 
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“continues to be fragmented and ambiguous” (Ang et al, 2015).  In addition to relying on private 
actors in the cultural industry to promote content abroad, much like the Japanese strategy, the 
Korean cultural diplomacy strategy is relatively decentralized.  Programs and activities are 
divided between a number of different committees and organizations, often with overlapping 
goals and responsibilities.    
Like Japan and South Korea, China has also begun to seriously invest in cultural 
diplomacy since the turn of the century.  While most of China's efforts at cultural diplomacy 
utilize China's historically influential traditional culture, they have increasingly begun to 
participate in the regional pop culture competition.  One reason China has a great interest in 
pop culture is that its massive population makes it by far the biggest market for cultural 
products in the region. While it still lags behind its neighbors in the exportation of cultural 
products, scholars have documented China’s growing interest in pop culture as a tool of cultural 
diplomacy (Garrison, 2005; Heng, 2010; Chua, 2012).  By 2008, for example, China had taken 
significant steps to commercialize its entertainment industry and become a competitive source 
of pop culture media.  These steps included making it easier for individuals and foreign 
corporations to invest in state-owned media companies, offering tax breaks to cultural 
producers, and direct investment in the production and dissemination of cultural products 
abroad (Goh, 2005).   
There is a clear trend within Japan, South Korea, and China towards the use of pop 
culture products as a cultural diplomacy strategy.  These states clearly expect that increased 
exposure to their unique cultural products will increase positive views within foreign 
populations.  However, recent examples of nationalist backlashes against the popularity of 
Japanese and South Korean pop cultures—such as the ones covered in Chapter 1—could mean 
17 
 
that increased exposure to foreign cultural products could actually increase negative attitudes 
of the cultural producer.  Given these conflicting empirical predictions, what kind of effect does 
pop culture diplomacy actually have on international perception in Asia? 
China, Japan, and South Korea all have programs in place to aid in the production of 
cultural products and to increase their cultural product exports.  There are differences, however.  
The Japanese government is the most hands-off of the three in its approach to cultural 
diplomacy, and relies on partnerships between the government and outside actors.  For 
example, the Japan Foundation offers funding for anime production companies that gain 
significant traction outside of Japan, but their support is retroactive and limited in nature 
compared to China's or South Korea's (Heng, 2010).  The government of South Korea, 
meanwhile, has provided its film industry with some direct financial support in the form of a 
$125 million fund from 1999 to 2003, but this amount was small enough that it was more 
symbolic than financially significant (Kang, 2015).  In fact, since the Motion Picture Promotion 
Law, Korean cinema is funded almost entirely by chaebols.  While the tax breaks and other 
incentives offered by the government proactively support of the production of Korean cultural 
products, this support is indirect unlike the direct investments from the Chinese government.   
Finally, China's pop culture strategy is more top-down and centrally directed in nature.  For 
example, the Chinese government directly pays for 30-40% of production fees incurred by its 
animation studios (Lent and Ying, 2013).  Additionally, many of the organizations involved in 
Chinese cultural relations are state-owned enterprises or answer to the Chinese government.   
The variance in the approaches employed by China, Japan, and South Korea allows me 
to test not only the efficacy of pop cultural diplomacy in general, but also to compare the 
relative merits of their different approach.  The Chinese approach is characterized by direct and 
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proactive government investment in the development and international dissemination of 
Chinese pop culture.  The South Korean approach provides proactive support to its pop culture 
industries, but the actual funding and investments comes from the private sector.  The Japanese 
approach is the most indirect and relies largely on providing retroactive support for companies 
and non-governmental organizations who promote Japanese pop culture abroad.  Do these 
different approaches affect the success of pop culture diplomacy?  If so, how? 
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Data and Research Design 
In order to test how cultural products can influence public opinion abroad, I run three 
models:  one each for China, Japan, and South Korea.  The dependent variable represents 
individual perception of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean influence.  I measure each 
respondent’s perception using the AsiaBarometer survey series, conducted across East, 
Southeast, and South Asia from 2003-2008.  I limit the countries I look at to those with 
observations for multiple years, leaving 11 importing countries per case: Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Vietnam (with the cultural exporter excluded in each case).   
 
Table 1        
  
Frequency of Responses 
 China Japan South Korea 
Positive view 11,706 
(52.09%) 
13,512 
(57.25%) 
9,231 
(42.89%) 
Negative/neutral view 10.765 
(47.91%) 
10,089 
(42.72%) 
12,231 
(57.11%) 
  
Each variable represents the response to the AsiaBarometer survey question, “Does 
[China/Japan/South Korea] have a good or bad influence on [your country]?”  This variable is 
equal to one if the respondent answered “good” or “mostly good,” and equal to zero if the 
respondent answered “bad,” “mostly bad,” or “neither good or bad.”  Table 1 shows the overall 
distribution of responses.  The independent variable in this test is exposure to cultural products 
from China, Japan, and South Korea.  I measure this variable using the total dollar value of 
cultural product imports from each cultural exporter to the respondent's country.  The list of 
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what constitutes a cultural product is taken from UNESCO's Framework for Cultural Statistics 
(2009) and data for cultural product imports is taken from the UN Comtrade database (see 
Appendix A). 
I also control for both individual level and state level variables that might have an effect 
on perceptions of the cultural producer.  These control variables are all listed in Table 2.  At the 
individual level, I use questions from the AsiaBarometer survey to control for several 
characteristics that may differentiate some audiences.  These questions include the 
respondent's self-professed level of patriotism and whether they self-identify as Asian.  I  
generate a set of dummy variables to control for other avenues of exposure to foreign cultures, 
such as whether the respondent travels abroad frequently, whether they have friends or family 
who live abroad, and whether they work with foreign people and organizations.  I also control 
for the respondent's view of the United States.  Thanks to the close alliances between the 
United States and Japan/South Korea, along with their similar political and economic systems, it 
is reasonable to assume that individuals who approve of US influence will be more likely to have 
positive views of Japanese and Korean influence.  Finally, I include control variables for 
demographic characteristics like gender, age, and education because they are also likely to 
affect individual views.   
At the state level, I control for the (weighted) distance between the cultural exporter 
and the respondent's country.  Data for distances is taken from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives 
et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) data set and is based on the distance between each 
country's largest city and weighted by the proportion of the total national population residing in 
the largest city.  I also include a variable indicating whether the respondent's country has been 
colonized by or had military conflicts with the cultural exporter.  This is intended to help control 
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for the lingering animosity in East Asia towards Japanese occupation during World War II and for 
different Cold War-era disputes.  The variable is equal to one if the respondent's country has 
had a military conflict with the cultural exporter either during World War II or anytime after, and 
is equal to two if the respondent's country has ever been colonized by the cultural exporter. 
 For empirical modeling, I use logistic regression to test the relationship between 
exposure to cultural products and how individuals in Asia view the cultural exporter.  I use 
Huber-White robust standard errors by clustering responses according to country to account for 
heteroskedasticity.  The independent variables are time-lagged in order to rule out reversed 
causality.  I also include year fixed effects in order to address possible heterogeneity and 
eliminate potential omitted variable bias.  
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Results and Analysis 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 2 as predicted probabilities.  In each 
case, an increase in the value of cultural product imports is associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in positive perceptions of the cultural exporter.  In other words, 
respondents from countries that import more cultural products are more likely to have negative 
views of the cultural producer.  For Japan, an increase of $100,000 in cultural product imports 
decreases the likelihood of a “good” or “mostly good” response by 0.35%, and the same 
increase in South Korean cultural product imports decreases the likelihood of a positive 
response by 0.23%.  The effect for China, while statistically significant, has a smaller substantive 
effect, decreasing the likelihood of a positive response by 0.04%.   
While these values might appear small, the large volume of trade in cultural products 
means that the effect is not insignificant.  For example, Vietnam imported $2.1 million in cultural 
products from Japan in 2002.  An increase in Japanese cultural products to the level imported by 
Thailand that same year—$5.3 million—would decrease the likelihood of a positive response by 
an average of 11.5%.  An increase in the same amount—$3.2 million—in South Korean cultural 
products would decrease the likelihood of a positive response by 7.4%.  The effect for China is less 
pronounced; a $3.2 million increase in Chinese cultural products would decrease the likelihood of 
a positive response by 1.3%. 
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Table 2 
 
Predicted Probabilities for Models 1-3 
Variable Model 1: China Model 2: Japan Model 3: South Korea 
Cultural product imports -0.0004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.0035** 
(0.00) 
-0.0023** 
(0.00) 
National pride -0.0225 
(0.02) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
0.0226 
(0.02) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0296** 
(0.01) 
0.0347** 
(0.01) 
Foreign relative -0.0167 
(0.01) 
0.0238** 
(0.01) 
0.0088 
(0.02) 
Foreign travel 0.0079 
(0.02) 
0.0399*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0191 
(0.03) 
Foreign friend 0.0264* 
(0.01) 
0.0204 
(0.01) 
-0.0008 
(0.01) 
Foreign correspondence 0.0018 
(0.02) 
0.0132 
(0.01) 
0.0015 
(0.02) 
Foreign job -0.0161 
(0.03) 
-0.0068 
(0.02) 
-0.0256 
(0.02) 
US influence 0.0869*** 
(0.01) 
0.0935*** 
(0.01) 
0.062*** 
(0.01) 
Age -0.0010 
(0.00) 
-0.0011** 
(0.00) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.00) 
Female -0.0303*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0455*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0373*** 
(0.01) 
University+ 0.0096 
(0.16) 
-0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0166* 
(0.01) 
Distance (in 1000 km) 0.0264 
(0.02) 
0.0662** 
(0.03) 
-0.0062 
(0.02) 
Conflict and Colonization -0.1996*** 
(0.06) 
-0.0056 
(0.08) 
0.1394*** 
(0.05) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 18479 18455 16769 
Note.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
The effects of the control variables are also interesting.  At the individual level, the best 
predictor of how respondents perceive the cultural exporter is how they perceive the United 
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States.  A more positive view of US influence was associated with an increase in how the 
exporter was perceived by between 6.2% and 9.35% in each case.  Female was also statistically 
significant in each model, with women being between 3.03% and 4.55% more likely to have a 
negative view of the cultural exporter's influence.  At the state level, conflict and colonization 
has a negative effect for China, no significant effect for Japan, and a positive effect for South 
Korea.  The only countries to have had a military conflict with South Korea since World War II 
are Japan and China, but this is still unexpected. 
It is also important to note that UNESCO's measurements of cultural products do not 
include digital sales, which are becoming an ever larger part of the transnational consumption of 
media products.  Unfortunately, accurate numbers for these transactions are not readily 
available.  Being able to account for the spread of cultural products online would provide a more 
accurate representation of exposure to foreign pop cultures, and it would be worthwhile to 
include digital media in future analyses of pop culture products.  As it stands, however, these 
findings are likely conservative.  Thanks to digital sales and online streaming sources, exposure 
to foreign cultural products is undoubtedly more widespread than physical media sales numbers 
would indicate. 
I conduct several robustness checks, which are listed in Appendix C.  Using a five-point 
dependent variable—where the responses range from “Very bad” to “Very good”—rather than 
a binary dependent variable still yields statistically significant results with a confidence interval 
of 99% in each model.  These results are also in the same direction of effect.  I also run each 
model separately for all countries, and most of the results fit with the main findings.  One 
exception is Malaysia, which is the only country where cultural imports are associated with 
more positive views in all three models.  The biggest exception, however, is the different effects 
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of Chinese cultural products.  Chinese cultural imports have a statistically significant positive 
effect on responses in four countries (Cambodia, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka) and a negative 
effect in four others (Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand).   
One explanation for the difference in effect between China and Japan/South Korea is 
the relatively small cultural impact Chinese products have had on other Asian countries.  
Japanese and South Korean cultural products have become an everyday part of life for many 
Asians.  Some cultural products from Japan and South Korea have large fan communities built 
around them and these are a source of identity and self-expression for many people.  Japanese 
manga and anime have fan bases spread throughout the world, and trendy television dramas 
from Japan and South Korea have dedicated fans throughout East and Southeast Asia.  The same 
is true for Japanese and South Korean pop stars and boy bands.  Chinese cultural products, on 
the other hand, have not yet had that kind of cultural impact.  While the Chinese government 
has begun to invest in promoting Chinese pop culture abroad, China still lacks the entrenched 
media infrastructure and widespread influence of the Japanese and South Korean cultural 
industries.  As a result, it is not all that surprising that the negative backlashes against Chinese 
cultural products aren't of the same magnitude as the ones against cultural products from Japan 
and South Korea.   
In support of this, the two countries with the largest positive effect for Chinese cultural 
product imports—Sri Lanka and Cambodia—also imported the fewest cultural products from 
China by a large margin (less than $10,000 in each case).  This would imply that smaller 
foreign cultural presences are not as likely to be met with a corresponding increase in 
nationalism.  This makes sense as people are not going to feel as if their domestic 
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culture is being threatened by a foreign culture they are not exposed to in their daily 
lives. 
Overall, these results are noteworthy because they suggest that cultural product 
imports can generate negative sentiment against foreign cultural producers that outweighs their 
positive impact.  If pop culture products are inherently more likely to lead to nationalist 
backlashes, cultural diplomacy strategies that rely on them are automatically at a disadvantage 
when it comes to improving a state's national image abroad.  This could be because the cultural 
products that are the most successful in the market are not necessarily the products most likely 
to increase support and sympathy within foreign populations.  If this is the case, then policy-
makers should note that investing in these industries can wind up being counterproductive. 
However, governments may have other motives for engaging in this type of cultural 
diplomacy other than its stated goal of improving public opinion abroad.  A number of scholars 
have noted that successfully exporting cultural products can provide states with domestic 
benefits by aiding in the process of “nation-building through nation-branding” (Huang, 2011; 
Chua, 2012; Barr, 2012).  The most obvious benefits are economic, resulting from greater export 
levels and a corresponding increase in tourism.  For one example of this in practice, the annual 
number of Taiwanese tourists visiting Japan increased from 498,595 to 1,309,847 as the 
popularity of Japanese television shows grew in Taiwan between 1995 and 2008 (Huang, 2011).  
Cultural development and the promotion of a national culture also “encourages citizens to feel 
confident in their homeland and promotes a sense of belonging, among self, nation and state,” 
which is an important part of state legitimacy (Barr, 2012, p. 83).  This means that even if 
cultural diplomacy leads to negative backlashes abroad, states may value the domestic 
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economic and political benefits of cultural development enough to invest in these programs.
  
Conclusions 
In summary, foreign cultural products are associated with a significant decrease in 
positive views of the cultural exporter.  These results suggest that if governments are promoting 
cultural products internationally with the sole goal of improving their national image abroad, 
they would be better off reevaluating their strategies.  However, there are also domestic 
benefits—both economic and political—to cultural diplomacy.  If states are more concerned 
about the economic benefits of nation-building or cultivating a stronger sense of national 
identity, investing in pop culture industries might still be worth the negative effects these 
strategies can have on foreign public opinion.  Nevertheless, other cultural diplomacy strategies 
that do not employ pop culture might be able to provide states with both domestic and 
international benefits.  Pop culture diplomacy might be unique in that increases in foreign pop 
culture products are associated with corresponding increases in nationalism.  In the next 
chapter, I test whether another cultural diplomacy strategy—cultural centers—also has a 
negative effect on national image. 
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Chapter III 
Confucius Institutes and Chinese Cultural Diplomacy 
In addition to supporting the development and spread of pop culture products, another 
frequently used cultural diplomacy strategy is the deployment of cultural centers abroad.  
Cultural centers can serve to educate foreigners about different aspects of national culture, 
organize cultural celebrations and festivals, and provide language education resources.  While 
both methods are intended to positively influence a country's national image, cultural centers 
might have a different impact on foreign public opinion than pop culture products.  This is 
because people form stronger emotional attachments to pop culture than to the presence of 
cultural centers and the functions they perform (Jenkins, 2007).  Cultural centers also tend to 
focus on traditional rather than popular culture, which is seen as inherently more apolitical 
(d'Hooghe, 2007).  As a result, cultural centers might not lead to the sort of nationalist 
backlashes that occur in response to pop culture imports.  While there are recent examples of 
protests and boycotts in response to the popularity of Japanese and South Korean pop culture in 
Asia, cultural centers have not resulted in this same kind of response.  In this chapter, I test how 
Chinese cultural centers—developed as a part of the Confucius Institute program—influence 
public opinion in Asia and see how this compares with the effects of pop culture diplomacy. 
China has the most expansive, coordinated, and ambitious cultural center program in 
East Asia, and possibly in the world.  The Confucius Institute project began in late 2004, and by 
October 2008 the Chinese government had established 326 Confucius Institutes in 81 different 
countries (Paradise, 2009).  The Institutes are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language 
Center International, usually referred to as Hanban.  According to Hanban's director, two of the 
program's main objectives are to facilitate Chinese language learning and to promote cultural 
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awareness and exchange (Paradise, 2009).  To this end, Hanban uses the Confucius Institute 
program to train and send teachers from China to other countries, offer Chinese language 
proficiency tests, provide teachers with language learning materials, and host cultural 
celebrations during traditional Chinese holidays (Paradise, 2009; Heng, 2010).  Confucius 
Institutes have become a key part of China's “systematic effort to increase China's attractiveness 
and influence through language and culture” (Lampton, 2008, p. 157). 
China's foreign policy is especially reliant on cultural diplomacy strategies.  As China is 
rapidly becoming a regional and global power, Chinese leaders rely on cultural diplomacy to 
demonstrate good intentions and support the idea of China's peaceful rise.  Critics of China fear 
that China's newfound military strength is a threat to peace in the region (Gill and Huang, 2006).  
There is also concern that China's economic growth is a threat to people's jobs (Sieren, 2005).  
Chinese decision-makers have therefore turned to cultural diplomacy as a way to counter these 
fears and promote a more positive image of China abroad (Hartig, 2011).  The belief that culture 
can be used by the state to advance the national interest abroad is widespread among Chinese 
political leaders.  In 2007, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference argued that “cultural development, a main theme in building a 
country’s soft power, plays a significant role in enhancing comprehensive national power” 
(Paradise, 2009, p. 658). 
China has specifically invested in the Confucius Institute program because language 
learning is viewed as way to shape international preferences and attitudes of China.  Learning 
the Chinese language has undoubtedly become increasingly popular as China's influence has 
grown.  The number of foreigners taking the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (the Chinese language 
proficiency test) increased by an impressive 26% from 2004 to 2005 (Paradise, 2009).  One of 
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the main purposes of the Confucius Institute project is to cultivate this growing interest by 
providing opportunities for foreigners to learn Chinese and making Chinese language education 
more accessible.  Research on second language learning has demonstrated that learning a 
foreign language tends to increase “appreciation and empathy for the speakers of the language 
and their society as a result of the learning process” (Gil, 2009, p. 66). 
In addition to increasing international support and sympathy, cultural diplomacy 
strategies can also serve a domestic purpose.  By developing aspects of national culture—
whether popular or traditional—governments can accomplish “nation-building through nation-
branding.”  In other words, promoting the idea of a common national culture can help unite 
people behind a sense of national identity.  While it lacks the pop culture presence of Japan and 
South Korea, China has turned to its traditional culture in order to fill a similar role.  In addition 
to improving its image abroad, part of the motivation behind Chinese cultural diplomacy is “to 
instill cultural pride, consolidate internal coherence against economic inequality, promote 
regime legitimacy through moral example, and create a ‘harmonious society’ to resist foreign 
cultural encroachment” (Heng, 2010, p. 286).   
The use of Chinese traditional culture and the references to Confucius demonstrate a 
dramatic shift in the Chinese government’s approach to traditional culture.  In the 1960s and 
70s during the Cultural Revolution, China sought to destroy or suppress any references to 
Confucius and China’s “old” culture in general.  By the early 21st century, however, Chinese 
leaders had opted to use Chinese traditional culture as the basis of its growing cultural 
diplomacy program.  While China has tried to encourage the growth of its pop culture industry—
as explained in the previous chapter—it lacks the massive media presence and infrastructure 
that have made Japanese and South Korean cultural products so commercially successful.  On 
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the other hand, China's long history as the cultural and economic center of Asia means that it 
does have a highly developed and widely recognized traditional culture.  Aspects of Chinese 
traditional culture—including art, food, and language—have infiltrated and shaped traditional 
cultures throughout East and Southeast Asia.  There are also sizable Han Chinese populations 
living across the region.  As a result, Chinese leaders have tried to take advantage of this legacy 
by emphasizing traditional Chinese culture in its cultural diplomacy strategy. 
So how do the effects of cultural centers compare with the effects of pop culture 
imports?  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, an increase in cultural product imports is 
associated with more negative views of the cultural producer.  There are examples of nationalist 
backlashes against successful pop culture industries, such as the appearance of Japanese anti-
Korean manga following the Korean Wave.  However, some of the benefits of cultural diplomacy 
are domestic rather than international.  These benefits include the economic benefits of tourism 
and building larger and more successful cultural industries, alongside the political and social 
benefits of developing a sense of national identity.  If states value these domestic benefits highly 
enough, they may still employ cultural diplomacy strategies even if they lead to a net decrease 
in national image abroad.   
Cultural centers, on the other hand, are an interesting case because they could be a way 
for states to gain the domestic benefits of cultural diplomacy without the negative 
consequences abroad.  This is because traditional cultures and language learning are not 
associated with the same kind of defensive emotional attachment as pop culture exports.  As a 
result, they might not have the same negative effect on foreign public opinion.  In fact, the links 
between second language learning and more sympathetic perspectives could mean that cultural 
centers have a positive rather than a negative effect on national image.  This could also lead to 
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economic benefits through increases in tourism and even greater business opportunities 
(Paradise, 2009).  In addition, by emphasizing unique and desirable traits from a society's 
traditional culture, they could help the state promote a sense of common identity.    
In this chapter, I test whether or not cultural centers—like cultural products—also have 
a negative effect on foreign public opinion.  As Paradise (2009) points out, polls from the BBC 
World Service and Pew Research both found that China's image deteriorated internationally 
between 2005 and 2007.  However, he notes that this global trend does not take into account 
the effects that different cultural diplomacy strategies might have on China's image in specific 
countries.  In order to measure how cultural centers influence foreign public opinion, I directly 
test the relationship between the presence of Confucius Institutes and perception of Chinese 
influence in Asia. 
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Research Design and Data 
I use the same research design as in the previous chapter.  The dependent variable is 
perception of Chinese influence in Asia, which I measure using the AsiaBarometer survey series.  
The independent variable in this case, however, is the presence of Confucius Institutes in the 
respondent's country.  The variable is equal to one if there was at least one Confucius Institute 
operational in the respondent's country the previous year, and equal to zero if there were none.  
For the data on Institute locations, I use Hanban's annual reports on the Confucius Institute 
program.  I use the presence rather than the number of Confucius Institutes because it provides 
us with more clear-cut results.  Because the difference between zero Confucius Institutes in a 
country and one Confucius Institute is greater than the difference between one and two, this 
accounts for the diminishing marginal returns on accumulated cultural centers.  I also run this 
test using the total number of Institutes, and the results  can be found in Appendix C. 
I include all of the individual and state level control variables used in Chapter 2.  All of 
the independent variables are listed in Appendix A.  At the individual level, I control for the 
respondent's self-professed level of patriotism, whether they self-identify as Asian, whether the 
respondent travels abroad frequently, whether they have friends or family who live abroad, 
whether they work with foreign people and organizations, and the respondent's view of the 
United States.  I also include control variables for gender, age, and education.  At the state level, 
I control for the distance between China and the respondent's country, weighted by population, 
and whether the respondent's country has had military conflicts with China since World War II.  
Finally, I include a new control variable representing the total value of imports from China to the 
respondent's country.  I do this because economic ties might have an influence on how 
individuals view Chinese influence.   
34 
 
I again use logistic regression to test the relationship between Confucius Institutes and 
perception of Chinese influence.  I use Huber-White robust standard errors by clustering 
responses according to countries to account for heteroskedasticity.  The independent variables 
are time-lagged in order to rule out reversed causality.  I include year fixed effects in order to 
address possible heterogeneity and eliminate potential omitted variable bias.   
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Results and Analysis 
The results are presented in Table 3.  The first column lists the coefficients and the 
second column lists the predicted probabilities.  The presence of Confucius Institutes in the 
respondent's country does, in fact, seem to have a positive effect on how individuals in Asia 
view Chinese influence.  Having at least one active Confucius Institute in the country is 
correlated with an 11.2% increase in positive responses.  This finding is statistically significant 
with a confidence interval of 99%, and the large magnitude of the effect demonstrates that it is 
also substantively significant.  This means that in addition to the domestic benefits of cultural 
diplomacy, cultural centers and language training facilities can work to benefit a state's national 
image abroad. 
As in the last chapter, I also conduct robustness checks.  These are listed in Appendix C.  
I find that using a five-point rather than a binary dependent variable, and using the total number 
of Confucius Institutes rather than the presence of at least one Institute, still yields statistically 
significant results in the same direction of influence. When separated by country, Confucius 
Institutes have a positive effect in four countries (Indonesia, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka) and 
a negative effect in Thailand and the Philippines.  This positive effect is also larger on average 
than the negative effect in either country. 
Out of the control variables, the only ones to have a significant effect at a confidence 
interval of 95% are perception of US influence, gender, and history of conflict.  A more positive 
view of US influence is associated with an increase of 8.52% in positive views of Chinese 
influence.  Women, on the other hand, were 3.14% less likely to have a positive view of Chinese 
influence.  At the state level, respondents from countries that have fought a military conflict  
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Table 3 
 
Coefficients and Predicted Probabilities for Model 4  
Variable Coefficients Predicted Probabilities 
Confucius Institutes 0.5318*** 
(0.14) 
0.1123*** 
(0.03) 
National pride -0.1015 
(0.09) 
-0.0214 
(0.02) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.0126 
(0.09) 
0.0027 
(0.02) 
Foreign relative -0.0463 
(0.05) 
-0.0098 
(0.01) 
Foreign travel 0.0136 
(0.19) 
0.0029 
(0.01) 
Foreign friend 0.1130 
(0.07) 
0.0239 
(0.01) 
Foreign correspondence 0.0138 
(0.09) 
0.0029 
(0.02) 
Foreign job -0.0842 
(0.15) 
-0.0178 
(0.03) 
US influence 0.4034*** 
(0.07) 
0.0852*** 
(0.01) 
Age -0.0057* 
(0.00) 
-0.0012* 
(0.00) 
Female -0.1486*** 
(0.04) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.01) 
University+ 0.0377 
(0.13) 
0.008 
(0.03) 
Distance (in 1000 km) 0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0281 
(0.02) 
Conflict -0.9688*** 
(0.28) 
-0.2046*** 
(0.06) 
Chinese imports -0.0062* 
(0.00) 
-0.0013* 
(0.00) 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
N 18479 18479 
Note.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
with China since 1937 (India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) were 20.46% less likely to have a 
positive view of China. 
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It would seem that unlike an increase in pop culture products, the presence of cultural 
centers is not linked to a corresponding increase in nationalism.  This finding is interesting 
because it demonstrates that different cultural diplomacy strategies can have widely different 
impacts on foreign public opinion.  As shown in the last chapter, an increase in cultural product 
imports is associated with a statistically significant decrease in positive views of the cultural 
exporter.  The presence of at least one Confucius Institute, on the other hand, is associated with 
an increase in positive views of Chinese influence.  This would suggest that cultural product 
imports are indeed more likely than the presence of foreign cultural centers to result in 
backlashes of negative sentiment against foreign cultural producers.   
Although Confucius Institutes have stirred up some negative sentiments in the United 
States in recent years, they have not triggered the kind of public responses Japanese and South 
Korean cultural products have in Asia.  Suspicion in the United States over Confucius Institutes is 
based on the fear that the Chinese government uses them to subvert academic discourse on 
China (Chua, 2012; Mosher, 2012).  This negative reaction, however, is not a widespread public 
response nor linked to corresponding cultural nationalism.   
Why are Confucius Institutes not associated with nationalist backlashes in the same way 
cultural products are?  Cultural centers generally function as an introduction to a country's 
traditional culture and often as a language learning resource.  They also help project an image of 
a country's people.  When writing about cultural centers, Paschalidis (2009) argues that “[this] 
projection is of a cohesive community, united by an uncontroversial, shared reality, a distinctive 
culture and heritage. By claiming to communicate the nation, to turn it into a communication, 
external cultural policy is primarily a special kind of cultural display” (p. 287).  The significance of 
highlighting traditional culture in this cultural display is that traditional culture is seen as less 
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political and relatively non-threatening abroad.  Unlike pop cultures, exposure to foreign 
traditional cultures and languages can increase sympathy and encourage more favorable views 
internationally.     
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Conclusions 
Based on these results, it seems that cultural centers such China's Confucius Institutes 
program have the potential to provide states with both domestic and international benefits.  
More cultural exposure in other countries and more opportunities for language learning can 
lead to a corresponding increase in tourism and business opportunities, providing states with 
domestic economic benefits.  At the same time, it can also still serve as a common point for the 
development of a national identity at home. 
These findings, alongside the results presented in Chapter 2, bring up an interesting 
question.  If the cultural center approach can result in all the benefits of the pop culture 
approach without the negative impact on foreign public opinion, why do states still invest in pop 
culture development and promotion?  One explanation is that the domestic benefits of pop 
culture development are significantly greater than the domestic benefits of cultural centers.  
The same emotional attachments that lead to nationalist backlashes against foreign pop 
cultures might increase the nation building potential of pop culture diplomacy at home.  For 
many people, pop culture plays a significant role in how they express themselves and construct 
their sense of identity.  Traditional culture does not play nearly as large of a role in most 
people's everyday lives and it does not have the same impact or importance to them.  Pop 
culture development can also be useful for states because media industries, especially those 
with significant export markets abroad, can generate a lot of wealth.  If the domestic benefits of 
pop culture development and promotion are great enough to outweigh the negative effects on 
foreign public opinion, states will continue to employ the pop culture approach to cultural 
diplomacy.    
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The Chinese government, for example, supports the production and export of Chinese 
pop culture products in addition to operating the Confucius Institute program.  Given the 
positive effect Confucius Institutes have on China's national image, cultural centers might be a 
way to balance out the negative effects of pop culture diplomacy.  As a result, it is likely that 
China will continue to invest in both its pop culture industry and in the Confucius Institute 
program as complementary parts of its cultural diplomacy program. 
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Chapter IV 
Overview of Research 
The aim of this research is to investigate the effects of cultural diplomacy strategies and 
approaches on foreign public opinion.  I focus on Asia, and specifically the cultural diplomacy 
programs of China, Japan, and South Korea.  I first examine pop culture diplomacy, which is 
based on the development of pop culture industries and exporting pop culture products abroad.  
While cultural diplomacy can provide states with both domestic and international benefits, 
examples of nationalist backlashes against foreign pop cultures suggest that this might not 
always be the case.  In fact, some scholars argue that cultural diplomacy can have a negative 
effect on how states are viewed abroad.   
Using the AsiaBarometer survey data, I first test the effects of Chinese, Japanese, and 
South Korean cultural product exports on how these countries are perceived in Asia.  I find that 
an increase in cultural product exports to the respondent's country has a negative effect on how 
respondents view the exporting country in all three cases.  The magnitude of the effect is 
different for each exporter, however.  The negative effect is largest for Japan, next largest for 
South Korea, and smallest for China.  I next test the effect of cultural centers using Confucius 
Institutes as the key independent variable.  I find that unlike cultural products, Confucius 
Institutes are associated with an increase in positive views of Chinese influence.  These results 
highlight the different and sometimes unexpected results cultural diplomacy programs can have 
on international public opinion. 
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Implications 
These findings have several important implications both for states engaging in cultural 
diplomacy and for academics studying its effects.  While cultural diplomacy has been around for 
a long time, it has become an increasingly large focus of many foreign policy agendas since the 
turn of the century.  A number of countries, from India to New Zealand, have recently begun to 
seriously invest in cultural diplomacy.  Thanks to a number of factors, like globalization and 
advances in technology, gaining influence through cultural diplomacy is increasingly seen as a 
better alternative than expending military/economic power.  Cultural diplomacy is also available 
to everyone; any state with attractive cultural traits and values (in line with global norms) can 
seek to gain influence through cultural diplomacy regardless of their military or economic 
strength.  As a result, cultural diplomacy is more relevant today than it has ever been before.  It 
is therefore important to understand its functions and its effects. 
While this research focuses on East Asia, there is significant reason to believe the results 
are generalizable outside of the region.  Examples of growing nationalist sentiments in response 
to a foreign cultural presence are not limited to East Asia.   For instance, the prevelance of the 
United States’ popular culture around the world has led to backlashes and condemnations of 
American cultural imperialism in New Zealand (Lealand, 1994) and Canada (Granatstein, 1996).  
In fact, cultural nationalism has long been a social and political force around the world, from 
Ireland (Hutchinson, 2012) to Palestine (Abu-Ghazaleh, 1972).  On top of this, one consequence 
of globalization is that it enables the rapid spread of cultural products.  As a result, countries 
have access to wider spheres of cultural influence.  As more states implement cultural 
diplomacy programs, the effects observed in this research are likely to be increasingly applicable 
around the world. 
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The first major implication this research has for the study of cultural diplomacy is the 
evidence that different cultural diplomacy programs can have different effects on foreign public 
opinion.  This may seem obvious, but previous studies have not distinguished between the 
different effects that different kinds of cultural diplomacy strategies can have.  These results 
demonstrate that it is important to recognize the effects that different kinds of cultural 
diplomacy can have when examining how they influence public opinion.   
The second significant implication of this research comes from the empirical evidence 
that pop culture products have a negative rather than a positive impact on foreign public 
opinion.  According to these results, pop culture products do not actually help states achieve 
international benefits from cultural diplomacy.  People are emotionally invested in pop culture 
and it often plays a significant role in shaping individual identities.  As a result, cultural 
diplomacy that relies on pop culture exports may result in greater domestic benefits, but it also 
tends to stir up nationalism and increase negative views of the cultural producer.  Cultural 
centers, on the other hand, appear to improve international perception and thereby bring about 
both domestic and international benefits.  By focusing on traditional cultures, they offer a more 
benign image of a state than its pop culture exports.  Increasing access to language learning 
resources is also a more reliable way to increase sympathetic views abroad.  Because of this, 
states solely interested in the economic benefits might be better advised to rely on cultural 
centers rather than programs focused on pop culture exports.  If the domestic benefits of pop 
culture products outweigh their negative effects on international opinion, however, states might 
still consider them a worthwhile investment.  If this is the case, states have an incentive to 
invest in both pop culture exports and cultural centers in order to maximize their domestic and 
international benefits.   
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Future Research 
This research is focused solely on the international benefits of cultural diplomacy.  
However, research into its domestic benefits might be necessary to explain why states engage in 
different cultural diplomacy strategies.  This would include research in how culture plays a role 
in nation building and the development of national identity.  How does the role of pop culture 
differ from the role of traditional culture?  Another similar avenue for further research would be 
the economic benefits of different pop culture industries.  If the wealth generated by a 
successful film industry, for example, is large enough, it might justify the negative consequences 
their products can have on foreign public opinion. 
A second area for further research would be the role of digital media in exposure to 
foreign cultural products.  Since these numbers are not publicly available, we are forced to rely 
on physical media purchases as indicators of cultural consumption.  Once we can take these 
sales into account, factoring in online streaming and downloads would provide a more accurate 
picture of cultural product consumption abroad.   
This research also only examines two kinds of cultural diplomacy strategy, cultural 
product exports and cultural centers.  In reality, states have a plethora of programs to choose 
between.  Some other examples would be educational exchanges and sporting events.  Study 
abroad programs, for instance, might be able to increase empathy for the host country.  
Another interesting area for future research would be the effect of hosting a major international 
sporting event, like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup, on a country's international image. 
Finally, additional indicators of cultural exposure would also provide more insight into 
how foreign cultural products can lead to nationalist backlashes.  One example would be to use 
the value of cultural product imports from an exporting country as a share of total imports from 
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that country as the key independent variable.  This would help to distinguish between cultural 
influence and influence derived from economic or political power.  Another useful indicator 
would be the cultural product imports from one country as a share of total cultural product 
imports.  This would better represent the relative cultural influence of different exporting 
countries.  Lastly, using a country’s cultural product imports as a share of its cultural product 
exports as the key independent variable would help take into account a country’s cultural 
presence.  Individuals from a country with high levels of cultural product exports might be less 
likely to feel like their domestic culture is being threatened by cultural product imports.  Each of 
these alternate indicators of cultural influence would help provide nuance and context to the 
findings of this research. 
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Appendix A 
Data, Measurements, and Variables 
Table 4 
 
List of Variables 
Variable Model Description 
Perception of influence  All Respondent answered the question, “Do you think 
[China/Japan/South Korea] has a good or bad influence on your 
country?” with “Very good” or “Good” 
Cultural product imports 1,2,3 The total value of cultural product imports from 
China/Japan/South Korea to the respondent's country 
Confucius Institutes 4 Equal to 1 if there is at least one Confucius Institute present in the 
respondent's country 
National pride All Respondent answered the question, “How proud are you of being 
[your country’s people]?” with “Very proud” 
Pan-Asian identity All Respondent answered the question, “Do you identify with any 
transnational group?” with “Asian” 
Foreign relatives All Respondent has relative or family member living abroad 
Foreign travel All Respondent has traveled abroad three or more times in the last 
year 
Foreign friend All Respondent has a friend from a foreign country living in their 
country 
Foreign correspondence All Respondent has frequent correspondence with people from other 
countries 
Foreign job All Respondent’s job involves contact with organizations and people 
from other countries 
US influence  All Respondent's views on US influence on their country; 5-point scale 
where 1 is equal to “Very bad” and 5 is equal to “Very good” 
Age All Respondent's age 
Female All Respondent is female 
University All Respondent has at least a university-level education 
Distance All Bilateral distance between China/Japan/South Korea and 
respondent's country, weighted by population 
Conflict  4 Respondent's country has had a military conflict with China since 
1937 
Conflict and Colonization 1,2,3 Equal to 1 if respondent's country has had a military conflict with 
the cultural exporter since 1937; Equal to 2 if respondent's country 
was ever colonized by the cultural exporter 
Chinese Imports 4 Total dollar value of imports from China to the respondent's 
country (in millions USD) 
Note. Models 1, 2, and 3 are from Chapter 2 and use cultural product imports from China, Japan, and 
South Korea as the independent variables. Model 4 is from Chapter 3 and uses the presence of Confucius 
Institutes as the independent variable. 
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Table 5 
 
List of Cultural Products 
Commodity code Commodity description 
4901 Printed books, brochures, leaflets, etc. 
490300 Children’s pictures, drawing or coloring books 
4902 Newspapers and periodicals 
490400 Printed music 
491191 Pictures, designs, and photographs  
852410 Gramophone records 
852431 Discs for laser-reading systems for reproducing sound 
9701 Paintings, drawings, pastels, collages, etc.  
950410 Video games used with a television receiver 
3706 Photographic and cinematographic film, exposed and developed 
Note. Codes used are from the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Appendix B 
Summary Statistics 
Table 6 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable    
Perception of influence (China) 0.5209 0.4996 0 1 
Perception of influence (Japan) 0.5725 0.4947 0 1 
Perception of influence (South   
Korea) 
0.4289 0.4949 0 1 
Key independent variables    
Cultural product imports (China) 5.7938 12.6139 0.0013 54.4519 
Cultural product imports (Japan)
 
  12.5616 15.4775 0.0806 44.4233 
Cultural product imports (South 
Korea) 
5.6509 13.1191 0.0590 64.6356 
Confucius Institutes 0.5210 0.4996 0 1 
Individual-level     
National pride 0.6593 0.4739 0 1 
Pan-Asian identity 0.5642 0.4959 0 1 
Foreign relatives 0.2342 0.4235 0 1 
Foreign travel 0.0687 0.2529 0 1 
Foreign friend 0.1110 0.3141 0 1 
Foreign correspondence 0.0642 0.2452 0 1 
Foreign job 0.0433 0.2036 0 1 
US influence  3.1926 1.1331 1 5 
Age 38.2850 11.9215 20 69 
Female 0.5124 0.4999 0 1 
University 0.1919 0.3938 0 1 
State-level     
Distance (China) 3153.630 1115.485 1168.165 4914.149 
Distance (Japan) 3973.210 1675.653 951.737 6600.833 
Distance (South Korea) 3389.173 1568.622 951.737 5781.108 
Conflict and Colonization (China) 0.4148 0.4927 0 1 
Conflict and Colonization (Japan) 1.1098 0.6239 0 2 
Conflict and Colonization (South 
Korea) 
0.1505 0.3576 0 1 
Chinese Imports 17028.380 25940.710 225.434 108477.600 
Note. All imports measured in 100,000 USD. Distances measured in km. 
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Appendix C: 
Robustness Checks 
Table 7 
 
Ordered Logit Coefficients Using 5-point Dependent Variable:  Cultural Product Imports 
Variable Model 1: China Model 2: Japan Model 3: South Korea 
Cultural product imports -0.0012*** 
(0.00) 
-0.0348*** 
(0.01) 
-0.0174*** 
(0.00) 
National pride -0.1130 
(0.07) 
-0.0739 
(0.10) 
0.0741 
(0.07) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.0079 
(0.08) 
0.2249*** 
(0.07) 
0.1603** 
(0.06) 
Foreign relative -0.0445 
(0.05) 
0.1533*** 
(0.05) 
0.0494 
(0.07) 
Foreign travel 0.1047 
(0.09) 
0.3393*** 
(0.06) 
-0.0334 
(0.11) 
Foreign friend 0.1100* 
(0.05) 
0.0717 
(0.08) 
0.0004 
(0.05) 
Foreign correspondence 0.0263 
(0.06) 
0.1397** 
(0.06) 
0.0246 
(0.07) 
Foreign job -0.0781 
(0.10) 
-0.0034 
(0.10) 
-0.1202 
(0.10) 
US influence 0.4569*** 
(0.08) 
0.5807*** 
(0.07) 
0.2961*** 
(0.04) 
Age -0.0034 
(0.00) 
-0.0056** 
(0.00) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.00) 
Female -0.0848* 
(0.04) 
-0.1591*** 
(0.06) 
-0.1061*** 
(0.03) 
University+ -0.0416 
(0.09) 
-0.1187 
(0.11) 
0.0307 
(0.04) 
Distance (in 1000 km) 0.1264 
(0.11) 
0.2998*** 
(0.11) 
-0.0507 
(0.06) 
Conflict and Colonization -0.9387*** 
(0.30) 
-0.0832 
(0.33) 
0.5389*** 
(0.14) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 18479 18455 16769 
Note.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8 
 
Ordered Logit Coefficients Using 5-point Dependent Variable:  Number of Confucius Institutes 
Variable Model 4: China 
Confucius Institutes (total) 0.0242** 
(0.01) 
National pride -0.1293* 
(0.07) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.0206 
(0.08) 
Foreign relative -0.0239 
(0.04) 
Foreign travel 0.1074 
(0.10) 
Foreign friend 0.0996* 
(0.05) 
Foreign correspondence 0.0338 
(0.06) 
Foreign job -0.0865 
(0.10) 
US influence 0.4560*** 
(0.08) 
Age -0.0040 
(0.00) 
Female -0.0882** 
(0.04) 
University+ -0.0496 
(0.09) 
Distance (in 1000 km) 0.1226 
(0.11) 
Conflict and Colonization -0.9635*** 
(0.30) 
Year Effects Yes 
N 18479 
Note.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9 
 
Regression Results by Country for Model 1: Japanese Cultural Product Imports 
Variable CHN IDN IND KHM KOR LKA MYS PHL SGP THA VNM 
Cultural product 
import 
-0.18*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.37) 
-0.18 
(0.49) 
-2.27*** 
(0.42) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.88*** 
(0.17) 
0.51*** 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
-0.30*** 
(0.07) 
National pride 0.02 
(0.10) 
0.29* 
(0.15) 
-0.55*** 
(0.21) 
0.32* 
(0.17) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.26** 
(0.11) 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
Pan-Asian 
identity 
0.10 
(0.15) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
0.38 
(0.24) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
0.41** 
(0.18) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.42*** 
(0.15) 
0.31** 
(0.12) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
Foreign relative 0.28** 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
Foreign travel 0.78*** 
(0.71) 
1.30 
(1.08) 
-0.68** 
(0.34) 
0.85* 
(0.49) 
0.16 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.33) 
-0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.23 
(0.26) 
-0.20 
(0.32) 
Foreign friend 0.52*** 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(0.45) 
-0.14 
(0.22) 
-0.13 
(0.26) 
0.56** 
(0.22) 
0.41* 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
0.19 
(0.18) 
0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
0.31** 
(0.13) 
Foreign corresp. -0.52** 
(0.23) 
-0.38 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
-0.39 
(0.25) 
-0.23 
(0.29) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.36 
(0.30) 
0.28* 
(0.12) 
0.27 
(0.30) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
Foreign job 0.27 
(0.24) 
-0.15 
(0.55) 
-0.09 
(0.35) 
-0.44 
(0.47) 
0.58*** 
(0.28) 
0.55 
(0.43) 
-0.32 
(0.25) 
-0.18 
(0.39) 
-0.44*** 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
0.20 
(0.22) 
Age -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Female -0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.38*** 
(0.10) 
0.30** 
(0.14) 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.43*** 
(0.13) 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
-0.42*** 
(0.08) 
University+ -0.13 
(0.12) 
0.25 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
0.74** 
(0.30) 
0.12** 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.16) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3670 1670 1807 1516 2529 1405 2340 1652 1595 2342 1562 
Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP 
= Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10 
 
Regression Results by Country for Model 2:  South Korean Cultural Product Imports 
Variable CHN IDN IND JPN KHM LKA MYS PHL SGP THA VNM 
Cultural product 
import 
0.51*** 
(0.14) 
-0.32*** 
(0.08) 
-0.36*** 
(0.07) 
-0.01* 
(0.42) 
-2.37*** 
(0.22) 
-1.43* 
(0.79) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.78*** 
(0.28) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
2.13*** 
(0.61) 
-0.19 
(0.36) 
National pride 0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.41 
(0.26) 
-0.12*** 
(0.20) 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
0.33** 
(0.16) 
0.37** 
(0.17) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.19) 
0.56*** 
(0.20) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
Foreign relative 0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.30 
(0.29) 
0.55*** 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
Foreign travel 0.06 
(0.23) 
-1.56* 
(0.84) 
-0.48 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
0.51 
(0.31) 
0.15 
(0.32) 
-0.26 
(0.20) 
-0.14 
(0.21) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
0.39 
(0.25) 
0.27 
(0.32) 
Foreign friend -0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.46 
(0.86) 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.22) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
Foreign corresp. -0.07 
(0.18) 
1.08 
(0.74) 
0.51 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.36 
(0.31) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
0.07 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.27) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
Foreign job -0.50** 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.44 
(0.41) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.33 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.39) 
-0.43* 
(0.24) 
-0.19 
(0.30) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.23 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.22) 
Age -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Female -0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.37*** 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
University+ 0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.35 
(0.33) 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.25** 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.24) 
0.13 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3670 1670 1807 2529 1516 1405 2340 1652 1595 2342 1562 
Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP 
= Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 11 
 
Regression Results by Country for Model 3:  Chinese Cultural Product Imports 
Variable IDN IND JPN KHM KOR LKA MYS PHL SGP THA VNM 
Cultural product 
import 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
9.53*** 
(0.82) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
2.40** 
(0.95) 
0.03** 
(0.04) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.25** 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
National pride 0.34** 
(0.15) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.33** 
(0.16) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.58*** 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
0.36** 
(0.18) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
0.50*** 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
Foreign relative -0.08 
(0.18) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
Foreign travel 1.04 
(0.71) 
-0.65* 
(0.35) 
0.43** 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.34) 
0.11 
(0.20) 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
1.04 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.27) 
1.19*** 
(0.42) 
Foreign friend -0.42 
(0.41) 
0.30 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.21) 
0.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
Foreign corresp. -0.10 
(0.63) 
-0.08 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.12 
(0.29) 
-0.53** 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
0.39* 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
0.34* 
(0.21) 
Foreign job 0.17 
(0.49) 
-0.41 
(0.33) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.80*** 
(0.27) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
-0.11 
(0.30) 
-0.53*** 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.34) 
-0.22 
(0.28) 
Age -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Female -0.02 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.26*** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
--0.13 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.18* 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.29*** 
(0.09) 
-0.18 
(0.11) 
University+ 0.25 
(0.25) 
-0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
0.20** 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.27) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.45*** 
(0.13) 
0.27 
(0.14)* 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1670 1807 2544 1516 2529 1405 2340 1652 1595 2342 1562 
Note. Country codes: CHN = China; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; KHM = Cambodia; KOR = South Korea; LKA = Sri Lanka; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP 
= Singapore; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12 
 
Regression Results by Country for Model 4: Confucius Institutes 
Variable IDN IND JPN KOR LKA MYS PHL SGP THA 
Cultural product 
import 
0.20** 
(0.10) 
1.09*** 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
0.34** 
(0.13) 
0.45*** 
(0.11) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.19* 
(0.00) 
-0.36** 
(0.12) 
National pride 0.34** 
(0.15) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.33** 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.20) 
Pan-Asian identity 0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.58*** 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
Foreign relative -0.08 
(0.18) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
Foreign travel 1.04 
(0.71) 
-0.65* 
(0.35) 
0.43** 
(0.17) 
-0.00 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.27) 
Foreign friend -0.42 
(0.41) 
0.30 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.57*** 
(0.21) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
Foreign corresp. -0.10 
(0.63) 
-0.08 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.52** 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
0.43* 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
0.28** 
(0.14) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
Foreign job 0.17 
(0.49) 
-0.42 
(0.33) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
0.85*** 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.38) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
-0.11 
(0.30) 
-0.54*** 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.35) 
Age -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Female -0.02 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.26*** 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.18* 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.27*** 
(0.09) 
University+ 0.25 
(0.25) 
-0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.26** 
(0.11) 
0.18** 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1670 1807 2544 2529 1405 2340 1652 1595 2342 
Note: Cambodia and Vietnam not included because no Confucius Institute was established in either country during the years covered by the survey. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
